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NOTES
IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL COURTS OVER
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN DIVERSITY CASES: STATE
VERSUS FEDERAL LAW UNDER ERIE R.R. v. TOMPKINS
Unto each Caesar, State or Federal, is thus rendered
that which properly belongs to that particular Caesar,
supreme in its distinctive field.'
Introduction
Since that historic decision of Mr. Justice Brandeis in 1938,2
an especially perplexing question has plagued the federal courts:
In what instances involving diversity of citizenship cases is state
law vis-a-vis federal law applied? 3 One particular area in which
the answer to this question is yet unsettled deals with the juris-
diction of a federal court over the person of a foreign corporation.4
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit faced this question
in June 1963, and held that the federal courts are to apply local
state law in determining whether a foreign corporation is sufficiently
present in the state so as to be amenable to suit. While the
decision might at first glance seem relatively consistent with our
preconceived ideas of the substance-procedure dichotomy supposedly
promulgated by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, it takes on much greater
significance in light of both the late Judge Clark's vigorous dissent 6
and the fact that in reaching its decision the circuit court sitting
en banc expressly overruled the alternate ground for decision-
the assertion of a federal standard-in a case it had decided but
three years previously.7
1. Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l
In the Federal District Court of Vermont, Harold Noel
Arrowsmith, a Maryland resident, brought a libel action against
United Press International, a foreign corporation formed under
' Address by Judge Dobie, The Conflict of State and Federal Judicial
Power, Association of the Bar of the City of New York, February 26,
1951, quoted in Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal
Common Law, 19 REcoRD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 64, 82 (1964).2 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
3See generally HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDEaAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYs ims 610-78 (1953); WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS §§55-60 (1963).
4 Friendly, supra note 1, at 78. See Kaplan, Amendments of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 1961-1963 (I), 77 HARV. L. REv. 601, 631-39(194).5 Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963).
6 Id. at 234.7 Id. at 225, overruling Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d
508 (2d Cir. 1960).
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the laws of New York.8 United Press International moved to
dismiss on various grounds, including lack of personal juris-
diction, improper venue, and failure of the complaint to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted. Judge Gibson granted
the defendant's motion, not on the jurisdictional grounds, but
because of plaintiff's failure to state a valid claim. 9  On appeal,
however, the Second Circuit ruled that Judge Gibson's failure
to consider the defendant's principal contention for dismissal,
viz., lack of personal jurisdiction over the foreign corporation,
was sufficient to necessitate reversal. Consequently, the case
was remanded to the lower court for a determination of the
issue of jurisdiction.' 0 Not content with merely reversing, how-
ever, the court also detailed the standards to be applied by the
lower court in determining whether it has jurisdiction over the
foreign corporate defendant. It directed the use of Vermont
state law in answering the jurisdictional question presented. By
so doing, the Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, used Arrowsmith
v. United Press Int'l to expressly overrule the alternate
ground for decision in Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc."
2. Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph -Mills, Inc.
To understand Judge Friendly's majority opinion in Arrow-
smith, the rationale of Jaftex must first be examined. Judge
Clark, a recognized authority in the area of federal practice,
1 2
speaking on behalf of the court in Jaftex, recognized both federal
and New York law as alternate grounds for holding the
particular service in question valid.1 3  He then declared that
the issue as to ."whether a foreign corporation is present in a
district to permit of service of process upon it is one of federal
8 Arrowsmith v. United Press Intl, 205 F.Supp. 56 (D. Vt. 1962).
Old. at 57-58. Since the allegedly libellous article was not defamatory
per se, plaintiff's failure to allege special damages precluded the granting
of any relief.
1OArrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, supra note 5, at 221. If the case
were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, this would not preclude a subsequent
action in an appropriate forum. However, the doctrine of res judicata
would prevent further litigation if the case were dismissed for failure to
state a valid claim.
From the thoroughness of their opinions and the number of authorities
cited therein, it appears that both Judges Clark and Friendly expected the
jurisdictional issue here raised to be passed on by the Supreme Court.
Unfortunately, however, certiorari has not been applied for.
11jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., supra note 7. Such sentiments
are expressed by Judge Clark in his dissent, where he describes the
Arrowsmith cage as "a rather poor vehicle" for accomplishing the destruction
of Jaftex. Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, supra note 5, at 235.
12 Monarch Ins. Co. v. Spach, 281 F.2d 401, 406 (5th Cir. 1960).
'3Sjaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., supra note 7, at 510.
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law governing the procedure of United States courts and is to
be determined accordingly." 14 The court concentrated on the
historical background of the federal "procedural" requirements
for both service and venue and, in homogenizing the two,
concluded that they should be "treated together, a not unnatural
course in view of their close connection." 15 Once having ac-
cepted this questionable premise, 16 the court noted that the
requisites for each were separated with the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, but deduced that
the requirement of "presence" still applied to both, notwith-
standing the fact that said requirement was included in the
venue section only. "Wholly consistent and apparently required
by this background is the parallel condition that a corporation
must be 'present,' i.e., doing business, within the district in order
to be subject to suit there.' 17  It is this basis of Judge Clark's
opinion, this background, this juxtaposing of venue and juris-
diction, with which Judge Friendly in the dissent took issue
and which he subsequently overruled in Arrowsmith.
3. A Comparison
Initially the Arrowsmith court notes that eight other circuits
have decided the issue contrary to the Jaftex rationale.'8
However, this does not seem to be entirely accurate, since in
the main the cases cited by Judge Friendly in support of this
statement are "removal" cases or cases arising under Federal
Rule 4(d) (7), which authorizes service according to state law,
as opposed to Federal Rule 4(d) (3), which does not specifically
mention state law and which is involved both in Jaftex and
Arrowsmith.19 While, as a result, the contention Judge Friendly
makes is somewhat diluted, his conclusion appears to be none-
theless valid based on his subsequent arguments. He states
that there is no federal statute or rule governing the area
either expressly or by implication.2 0  The federal venue
statute,21 which stipulates a "doing business" test, applies only
to venue and not to jurisdiction.22  While rule 4(d) (7) author-
izes service prescribed by state law, it does not indicate that
14Id. at 516.
151d. at 512.
16Id. at 516-22. Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, supra note 5, at
225.
17 jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., supra note 7, at 512. (Emphasis
added.)
18 Arrowsrnith v. United Press Int'l, supra note 5, at 223.
19 Id. at 242-44.
2 0 Id. at 225.
2128 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1958).
22 Arrowsmith v. United Press Intl, supra note 5, at 225.
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rule 4(d) (3) authorizes a federal standard to be applied in
determining jurisdiction.23  In concluding this argument, Judge
Friendly states that
. . . Rule 4(d) (3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure tells how service
of process is to be made upon a corporation which is subject to service;
but it does not tell when the corporation is so subject.2 4
Thus one of Judge Clark's chief arguments is rejected, viz.,
that there is a federal statutory or quasi-statutory basis for
establishing as a matter of federal law, the requirement of
"presence" of a foreign corporation as grounds for personal
jurisdiction. Such does not seem to be the case, especially in
light of the wording in the pertinent statutes.2 5  Venue and
the forum non conveniens doctrine are premised on the con-
venience and locale of the suit; 26 service of process is based
on the manner in which a defendant is served; 27 jurisdiction is
founded on the power of a court to so litigate an issue.28  These
distinctions seem to be fundamental and hence support the
Arrowsmith decision.
Upon an examination of Judge Clark's additional arguments
for the application of a federal standard, Judge Friendly points
out that the background of the diversity clause in the Con-
stitution appears to indicate that the same standard be applied
in the federal courts as in the state courts, absent any specific
legislation to the contrary.29  Moreover, he concludes that the writer
of an opinion3 0 relied on by Judge Clark was "unconscious that
he was giving birth to a 'federal standard' of jurisdiction over
foreign corporations;" ' 1 that there is no countervailing federal
policy demanding disregard of state jurisd ictional laws; 32 and
that therefore the "jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
is to be determined . . . on the basis of constitutionally valid
Vermont law. . .. " 33
23 "[l]t is also sufficient if the summons and complaint are served in the
manner prescribed by ... the law of the state in which service is made ......
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d) (7). No reference is made here or in FED. R. Civ. P.
4(d) (3) to a federal standard on which to predicate jurisdiction.24 Arrowsmjth v. United Press Int'l, supra note 5, at 226, quoting
HART & WEcrsLER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 959. (Emphasis added.)
25 Compare, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1958), with FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d) (3).
2628 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1958).2 7 FED. R. Crv. P. 4(d)(3), (7).
28 28 U.S.C. ch. 85 (1958).
29 Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, supra note 5, at 226-27.
3 0 Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100 (1898).
31 Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 229 (2d Cir. 1963).
32 Id. at 230.
83 Id. at 231.
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4. The Conflict
Thus the two opposing camps have drawn their battlelines.
On the one side we have the "Friendly" forces, wearing the
"erieantompkinated" colors of state law, 34 armed with the Erie
rationale and a clear intent to overrule Jaftex.35  On the other
side are the "not-so-Friendly" forces, wearing the injured colors
of federalism, and armed with Federal Rule 4(d)(3), section
1391(c) and the Jaftex rationale.3 6  Judge Clark argues that
the issue does not involve such a significant reflection of state
policy as to make the matter substantive for Erie purposes.
The federal courts constitute an independent judicial system,
and litigants invoking their jurisdiction are entitled to the essen-
tials of a trial according to federal standards.37
Judge Friendly, however, states that the federal rules relied
on by Judge Clark refer only to the manner of service, not
to the jurisdictional power of the courts.38 The purpose of the
diversity clause is to prevent discrimination and to discourage
forum-shopping. Furthermore, as has been indicated, "the post-
Erie body of precedent overwhelmingly supports the application
of a state standard. ' 3  Because of this serious conflict, an
analysis of the Erie case and its offspring is essential.
Erie and the Federal Rules of Cizil Procedure
These rules govern the procedure in the United States district courts in
all suits of a civil nature .... 40
Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of
Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State ...
There is no federal general common law. Congress has no power to declare
substantive rules of common law applicable in a State.... 4 '
The sources of these two almost simultaneous edicts pro-
mulgated twenty-six years ago by the Supreme Court have
apparently had equally significant, yet somewhat contrary, effects
on the processes of the federal judicial system. They "re-
volutionized almost every phase of practice in the federal
courts."42 While the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have
a See Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omni-
presence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 269 (1946).35 Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, supra note 31, at 225.36 Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960).37 Arrowsmith v. United Press Intl, supra note 31, at 235.
38 Id. at 225-26.
3977 HARV. L. Rsv. 559, 560 (1964).
40 FED. R, CIv. P. 1.
41 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
42 Merrigan, Erie to York to Ragan--A Triple Play on the Federal Rules,
3 VAND. L. REv. 711 (1950).
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proved to be a unifying guide for procedure in the lower federal
courts, the Erie edict has not only greatly reduced substantive
unity among these courts, but has also stimulated a much
greater deference to varying state laws and policies. 43  Ir-
respective of the desirability of either,44 their concurrent birth
gave rise to discord in the area of the diversity case4 5 and led
to the problems presented in Arrowsmith.
In overruling Swift v. Tyson,46 the Supreme Court l-uc-
cumbed to the strong opposition which the ninety-six year old
landmark case had elicited.47  However, the new principles
evolved were vague and indefinite, and left the lower federal
courts, to some extent, in a state of turmoil and confusion.48
While there was no doubt that Erie meant that state decisional
law was to be applied by federal courts, the following problems
remained. When are the district courts to apply state decisional
law and what standard is to be applied in so doing?
48 Ibid. Four months prior to the Erie decision "the Supreme Court had
adopted rules of civil procedure, effective only several months later, designed
to make uniform the procedure in all the federal courts throughout the
country. Thus at the time the Court was substituting uniformity for state
conformity in procedure, it was requiring state conformity in substantive
matters." Clark, supra note 34, at 288.
44 It is not within the scope of this article to discuss the relative merits
of Erie vis-a-vis the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but for a general
discussion, see HART & WECHSLER, THE FEmA.r COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYsrEm 610-78 (1953); Boner, Erie v. Tompkins: A Study in Judicial
Precedent (pts. I & II), 40 TExAs L. Rav. 509, 619 (1962); Clark, The
Tompkins Case and The Federal Rules, 1 F.R.D. 417 (1940); Hart, The
Relations Between State And Federal Law, 54 COLUm. L. REv. 489 (1954);
Keeffe, Gilhooley, Bailey & Day, Weary Erie, 34 CORNELL L.Q. 494 (1949);
Vestal, Expanding The Jurisdictional Reach Of The Federal Courts: The
1963 Changes it Federal Rule 4, 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1053 (1963).
45 The following statement by Chief Judge Parker, Court of Appeals
(4th Cir.), is indicative of the negative reaction with which Erie was
received: "I shall never forget hearing one of the ablest and most forward-
looking of our federal judges say shortly afterward [i.e., after Erie] that
he regarded it as the greatest backward step in the development of the
law that had been taken in his lifetime." Parker, Erie v. Tompkins in
Retrospect: An Analysis of Its Proper Area and Limits, 35 A.B.A.J. 19
(1949).
4641 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
47 Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab
& Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 535 (1928); Warren, New Light on the
History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49 passim
(1923).
48 "Naturally we must begin with Mr. Tompkins' unfortunate error in
getting tangled up with the Erie Railroad-unfortunate certainly for himself,
if not for us 'lower' federal judges." Clark, Procedural Aspects of the
New State Independence, 8 GEo. WASH. L. Rxv. 1230 (1940).
[ VOL. 38
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Development of an Erie Standard
The first test formulated in answer to these questions was
the ineffectual "substance-procedure" criterion, expounded in Klaxon
Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co.4 9 As seen in retrospect, this first
attempt at interpreting Erie did not prove to be entirely adequate50
While in some instances there are patent differences between what
is characterized as procedural law as opposed to substantive law,
nevertheless there exist many situations in which such characteriza-
tion approaches the impossible. Hence this first test did not aid
greatly in solving the troublesome problems to which Erie was
applied. Consequently, in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,5 1 the
Supreme Court saw fit to enunciate the "outcome-determinative"
test, the second major step taken in broadening the purview of the
famous Erie decision. 52
In describing Erie, and at the same time providing the basic
rationale for the York decision, the Court maintained that:
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins was not an endeavor to formulate scientific
legal terminology [such as the substance-procedure test]. . . . In
essence, the intent of that decision was to insure that, in all cases where a
federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of the diversity of
citizenship of the parties, the outcome of the litigation, in the federal
court should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the
outcome of a litigation as it would be if tried in a State court.-5
The difference in approach is immediately apparent. The
mechanical substance-procedure test was to some extent discarded
in favor of a more liberal and encompassing standard. The test
here evolved to determine Erie's applicability depends on the
predictable outcome of a case. If the result would vary substantially
under federal law, then state law must be applied. There are two
basic reasons for this approach: (1) forum-shopping will thereby
be greatly discouraged; and (2) historically there is no reason
to have different law applied in pure diversity cases. 54  Certainly
the extent to which this doctrine increased the application of
state law by the federal courts is manifest. If there was a fore-
seeable difference of outcome between the state courts' processes
and those of the district courts, the former would prevail.
49313 U.S. 487 (1941). See generally Hart, supra note 44, at 510-13;
Tunks, Categorization And Federalism: "Substance" And "Procedure" After
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 34 ILL. L. REV. 271 (1939).
50 Keeffe, Gilhooley, Bailey & Day, supra note 44.
51326 U.S. 99 (1945).
52 "Since 1945 . . . it has become increasingly apparent that the Court
does not intend to be bound by any imaginary line of demarcation between
substance and procedure." Merrigan, supra note 42.53 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).54Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, supra note 31.
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In Angel v. Bullington,5 5 this rationale was apparently applied.
The plaintiff sued for a deficiency judgment in the North Carolina
state courts on a cause of action expressly barred by a state statute.
After dismissal by the highest state court, Bullington, rather than
appeal to the Supreme Court, instituted an identical suit in the
federal district court. After both the lower court and the Cotirt
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found for the plaintiff the
Supreme Court reversed, basing its decision partly on the York
interpretation of Erie and, in part, on res judicata. 56 The Court
stated that, "For purposes of diversity jurisdiction a federal
court is, 'in effect, only another court of the State.' "5 The
rationale, based on Erie, was clear:
a North Carolina statute, upheld by the highest court of North
Carolina, is of course expressive of North Carolina policy. The essence
of diversity jurisdiction is that a federal court enforces State law and
State policy. . . . A federal court in North Carolina, when invoked
on grounds of diversity of citizenship, cannot give that which North
Carolina has withheld.58
Hence, the state statute, actually described by the state court as
procedural,5" was held to be indicative of state policy and, because
of the state court's decision, precluded any other result in the
federal courts.
As was to be expected, thiq .outcome-determinative test was
the subject of much discussion and' criticism, often emanating from
the Supreme Court itself. For example, Mr. Justice Rutledge
criticized this departure from the substance-procedure test.60 Dis-
senting in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,6 he referred
to the original standard, and at the same time presaged the next
development in tbe Supreme Court's interpretation of Erie:
The real question is not whether the separation [substance-procedure] shall
be made, but how it shall be made: whether mechanically by reference
to whether the state courts' doors are open or closed, or by a consideration
of the policies . . . of the Erie rule with Congress' power to govern
the incidents of litigation in diversity suits. 62
Nevertheless. acceptance of the outcome-determinative test was
forthcoming, and with it came considerable anxiety for those who
feared the complete sterilization of the district court in diversity
55330 U.S. 183 (1947).
56 Id. at 192.
57 Id. at 187.
58 Id. at 191-92.
59 Id. at 189.
60 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, supra note 53, at 112.
61337 U.S. 541, 557 (1949).62 Id. at 559.
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cases. 63 As Mr. Justice Rutledge emphasized, "the accepted dichotomy
is the familiar 'procedural-substantive' one. . . . [T]his fact
[that rational separation becomes almost impossible] cannot dis-
pense with the necessity of making a distinction." 04 In Ragan v.
Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co.,65 decided the same day
as Cohen, the Court gave a further example of the use of the
outcome-determinative test. There a conflict of laws question
was presented. A Kansas two-year statute of limitations pertaining
to causes of action arising out of motor vehicle accidents could
not be tolled in the state courts until service of summons. How-
ever, since this was a diversity suit brought in the federal district
court, the plaintiff claimed that the Kansas statute of limitations
should be tolled upon filing of the complaint which he had done
within the two years, as opposed to the serving of summons, which
he had not done within the required period. In finding for the
defendant, the Court held that it was a local cause of action,
and hence the local rule as to tolling of the statute must be
applied.66 Invoking the Erie doctrine as interpreted by York, the
Court stated that "if recovery could not be had in the state court,
it should be denied in the federal court." 67
This "outcome" standard thus seemed firmly entrenched in the
judicial attitude of the Supreme Court. However, the gradual
tendency since 1938 to increase the areas of law wherein federal
courts were to apply state law received somewhat of a setback
in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc.,6 where it was
decided by a divided Court that a right to a jury trial could
not be denied despite a state policy to the contrary. While the
test formulated by York was by no means overruled, its application
was limited to the extent that it was no longer all-pervasive. This
new interpretation of Erie, a further addition to the "erieantomp-
kinated" body of law already discussed in reams of legal writings,
brought to the York test the considerations desired by Mr. Justice
Rutledge ten years earlier.6 9 While the Byrd court recognized the
outcome-determinative test, it added a: significant caveat, the effect
of which has not yet been fully determined. Even if there is a
definite state policy indicated, nonetheless federal law may be
63 "Notice that an 'outcome' test, unless worded with much greater nicety
than in the York opinion, yields no stopping place, since virtually all pro-
cedural rules may, and on occasion do, affect the result of the litigation."
HART & WECHSL E, op. cit. supra note 44, at 678.
64 Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 557 (1949).
65 337 U.S. 530 (1949).66 Id. at 533.
67 Id. at 532.
68 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
69 See text accompanying note 62 supra.
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applied if there is a "strong countervailing federal policy" 70
which the state rule disrupts. There thus appears to be a lim-
itation on the outcome-determinative test, although it has been
suggested that the Byrd decision is based primarily on a seventh
amendment constitutional right, and hence, to a great extent, dis-
tinguishable from the preceding cases in the area. 71  Such an
interpretation seems to receive support from the Supreme Court's
recent 1963 decision of Simler v. Connor.72  Citing the Byrd case
as authority, the Court agreed with the respondent "that the right
to a jury trial in the federal courts is to be determined as a
matter of federal law in diversity as well as other actions. The
federal policy favoring jury trials is of historic and continuing
strength." 73 If this be primarily a constitutional consideration,
the outcome-determinative test is not greatly affected. Judge
Friendly, in Arrowsmith, indicates that these two cases are based
on a federal policy favoring jury decisions of disputed factual
questions, "a policy framed 'under the influence-if not the com-
mand-of the Seventh Amendment.' ' 7 4  If this approach is
followed by the Supreme Court, the York test still stands, and as
such must be the focal point in any discussion, criticism or
application of Erie today.75
Erie Applied by Lower Federal Courts
In order to appreciate the perplexities thus faced by the
Arrowsmith court in applying the Erie rule, several other lower
federal court decisions must also be considered because of their
manifest influence on the opinions of Judge Friendly and Judge
Clark. Two of these decisions dealt at some length with the
controversy of state versus federal law. Notwithstanding any
70 For an interesting discussion of the Byrd case, see Smith, Blue Ridge
and Beyond: A Byrd's-Eye View of Federalism in Diversity Litigation,
36 TUL. L. REv. 443 (1962).
71 Id. at 448-51.
72372 U.S. 221 (1963).
73 d. at 222.
74 Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 230 (2d Cir. 1963).
75 While it is not within the scope of this note to attempt to suggest
the ideal solution to the problems arising from Erie, it is appropriate to
'mention several suggestions that have already been proposed: (1) Abolish
federal diversity jurisdiction by constitutional amendment, or overrule Erie,
Boner, Erie v. Tompkins: A Study in Judicial Precedent (pt. II), 40 TExAs
L. REv. 619, 638 (1962); (2) Apply state procedural law in all diversity
cases, Merrigan, Erie to York to Ragan--A Triple Play on the Federal
Rules, 3 VANI). L. REv. 711, 726 (1950); (3) Apply federal law only when
authorized to do so by statute, Note, 67 YALE L.J. 1094, 1103 (1958), com-
mented on in Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508, 515-16
(2d Cir. 1960) ; (4) Adopt an elimination-of-forum-shopping test, Horowitz,
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins-A Test To Determine Those Rules of State Law
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prevalent tendency to the contrary, they resulted in an application
of federal law.
76
In fovino v. Waterson,77 the plaintiff moved under Federal
Rule 25(a) (1) 78 to have the New York District Court appoint
and substitute an administratrix ad litem for the deceased New
Jersey defendant. The substituted administratrix, also a New
Jersey resident, objected to this on the grounds that such sub-
stitution was contrary to New Jersey policy. Therefore, it was
argued, any application of rule 25(a) (1) to the non-resident
defendant would be contrary to the outcome-determinative standard
and would thus transcend federal legislative power.79  The Court
of Appeals, however, distinguished lovino from York on two
grounds: (1) the district court sat in New York, and there
was no evidence of a New York policy against such substitution;
and (2) there was a federal statute directly governing the area,
a factor lacking in the York decision. 0
In a more recent case, Hope v. Hearst Consol. Publications,
Inc.,)" the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit again came
to grips with the .Erie problem. Evidence showing that a libel
had caused injury to property rights, had been coercive and had
been in restraint of trade was admissible under Federal Rule
43(a) ,82 but inadmissible under New York law. 3  In accordance
with the federal standard, the evidence was admitted on the
following grounds: (1) it would have been admissible under
the pre-1938 equity rules; 84 (2) there was a federal statute
directly governing the area; 8 5 and (3) ". . . the New York
exclusionary rule represents a distinct, if not a lone, minority
voice" in contradistinction to "the vast majority of reported
cases." 86
The rationale of these two cases may seem inconsistent with
that of Arrowsmith, since a strict application of the outcome-
determinative standard in both cases would have resulted in an
To Which Its Doctrine Applies, 23 So. CAL. L. REv. 204, 219 (1950); and
(5) Return to the substance-procedure test, HART & WEcHsLER, THE FED-
ERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEm 610-78 (1953).76 Hope v. Hearst Consol. Publications, Inc., 294 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1961);
Iovino v. Waterson, 274 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1959).77 Supra note 76.
78 "If a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court
within two years after the death may order substitution of the proper parties."
FED. R. Crv. P. 25(a)(1).
79 Tovino v. Waterson, supra note 76, at 47.
80 Ibid.
81 Supra note 76.
s2 FED. R. Civ. P. 43(a).
8 3 Van Vechten v. Hopkins, 5 Johns. R. 211 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jud. 1809).
84 Hope v. Hearst Consol. Publications, Inc., sapra note 76, at 690.
85 Id. at 683.
86 Id. at 688.
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application of state law, as was done in Arrowsmith. The significant
difference in lovino and Hope is the emphasis by the court on
federal law and federal policy. Although Judge Clark finds them
irreconcilable with Arrowsmith,87 both cases were reaffirmed by
Judge Friendly, and apparently validly distinguished:
[A]nd we reaffirm decisions of this Court that have sustained the applica-
tion of certain Federal Rules of Civil Procedure differing from the rules
applied by the state where the court, sits [citing both Jovino and Hope]
... . But we find no federal policy that should lead federal courts in
diversity cases to override valid state laws as to the subjection of foreign
corporations to suit, in the absence of direction by federal statute or rule.85
It must be noted that both Judge Clark's dissent in Arrow-
smith and the majority opinion in Hope v. Hearst Consol. Pub-
lications, Inc. rely heavily on a Fifth Circuit decision dealing with
the admissibility of evidence. However, that case, Monarch Ins.
Co. v. Spach,s9 is readily distinguishably from Arrowsmith, since
the application of the outcome-determinative test would not have
had a significant effect on the decision. Although a Florida statute
would have excluded the evidence in question, because of certain
procedures embodied in the Federal Rules, "only to the most
unresourceful advocate would this Florida statute ever
present an effective bar to the introduction of such evidence.90
In reaching its decision in favor of applying the federal law,
moreover, the court expounded its philosophy regarding the Erie
doctrine. It agreed with Mr. Justice Rutledge, in that the
artificial labeling of state rules as procedural or substantive is not
an effective solution to the Erie problem.91 This is not to sa
that there could be no such distinction drawn. However, even
where it can be made, it may prove to be inconclusive regarding
which law is to be applied.
[The Supreme Court] recognized that in this profound realm of federalism
there were some [state] procedural rules which so far affect rights and the
outcome of the case as to require that they be followed by the federal
court.9
-
Thus, the court realized that the substance-procedure test, the
initial test begotten by Erie, was no longer the rule to be applied.
Yet, its willingness to accept the outcome-determinative test was
less than enthusiastic, as the court feared an attack on the
Federal Rules by shrewd lawyers and obedient lower tribunals.
93
87 Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, supra note 74, at 238.
88 Id. at 225 (Emphasis added.)
89281 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1960).
9o Id. at 412.
91Id. at 404.
92Id. at 405.
93Id. at 406.
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Conclusion
Judge Clark relied on the Monarch case to support his dissent
in Arrowsmith. In addition, he cited many secondary authorities
to suggest that Monarch, lovino and Jaftex support the conclusion
that there is an increasing trend toward federal court control
over its own organization and procedure. 94  Although this con-
tention may be true, it does little to strengthen Judge Clark's argu-
ment. The authorities he cites seem to deal primarily with Erie
problems in general; only one appears to refer specifically to the
question of in personam jurisdiction over a foreign corporation.95
Hence, while the late Judge's judicial philosophy advocating a
stronger and more independent federal court system receives some
support, his legal analysis of the issue in Arrowsmith does not
seem to fare as well.
In his dissent Judge Clark claims that to make use of state
law in determining whether a foreign corporation is present
within a district court's jurisdiction so as to be amenable to suit
is contrary to learned authority, strong precedent, and statutory
construction of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It is here
suggested that not only is this an unsound approach, but that
regardless of the year of the Arrowsmith decision, the result reached
should have been the same. That is, the-law of the state wherein
the district court sits should determine whether a foreign cor-
poration is subject to the court's jurisdiction, whether this is
accomplished by the explicit language of Mr. Justice Brandeis in
Erie; by the substance-procedure and outcome-determinative stand-
ards developed in the York and Bullington line of decisions; or
through the countervailing federal policy test imposed by Byrd
and Simler.
The statement in Erie seems very clear: "Except in matters
governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the
law to be applied in any case is the law of the state. . .. " go
Since this jurisdictional issue is not governed by the Constitution,9T
and since Federal Rule 4(d) (3) (service of process) and section
1391(c) (venue) do not expressly provide statutory authorization
9 See, e.g., Degnan, The Law of Federal Evidence Reform, 76 HA.V.
L. Rzv. 275 (1962); Ladd, Uniform Evidence Rules in the Federal Courts,
49 VA. L. REv. 692 (1963).
95 Green, Federal Jurisdiction In Personam of Corporations And Due
Process, 14 VAND. L. REv. 967 (1961).9 6 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).97 Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law,
19 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 64, 94 n.23 (1964); cf. Hill, The Erie Doctrine
and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 427 (1958). For an excellent dis-
cussion of the constitutional issues, see Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
The Supreme Court And The Erie Doctrine in Diversity Cases, 67 YALE
L.J. 187, 188-204 (1957).
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for application of a federal standard,98 Erie's language itself would
indicate that the Arrowsmith decision is correct. Likewise, under
the outcome-determinative test of York, it would seem clear
that state law is to be applied in a determination of the court's
jurisdiction. What could affect the outcome of a case more sub-
stantially than the rules determining whether a court has juris-
diction? Finally, under the Byrd test there is no countervailing
federal policy demanding the application of a federal standard to
the jurisdictional problem.
If the application of these various tests demonstrates that
there is a sound and substantial basis in Erie for the Arrowsinith
decision, the fact that the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reached this result only by expressly overruling one of its recent
decisions is disturbing. This sharp reversal seems to result from
the confusion and apprehension with which the federal courts
greeted Erie in 1938. 99
There was an immediate and vigorous reaction to Erie. Federal
judges were not sure if they liked the new rule, or even if they
understood it. Gradually, however, their reluctant acceptance of
its basic rationale became evident.' 00 Despite this acceptance, there
remains much opposition to the current interpretation of Erie.'0 '
Confusion on the part of federal judges twenty-five years ago was
to be expected, especially in view of the many interpretations
surrounding the decision. However, continued confusion seems
fruitless and unnecessary. It is suggested that a fair and work-
able standard has already been developed under which "eriean-
tompkinated" problems may be adequately resolved. While the
Supreme Court has yet to pass on the Arrowsmith issue, to do
so might be unnecessary. It seems that the majority of circuits
agree that in such circumstances state law is to be applied.'
02
Furthermore, a rationale drawn from the Monarch, lovino, Hope
and Arrowsmith opinions can supply the federal courts with the
necessary standards to be applied in diversity cases involving prob-
lems of state versus federal law.
To further define the standard to be applied in such cases,
Judge Friendly is careful to distinguish between instances where
there is a strong federal policy directing one result and instances
lacking such policy considerations and requiring deference to state
law.
98 Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, supra note 74, at 224-26.
99 Parker, Erie v. Tompkins in Retrospect: An Analysis of Its Proper
Area and Limits, 35 A.B.A.J. 19 (1949).
10 Smith, Blue Ridge And Beyond: A Byrd's-Eye View Of Federalism
In Diversity Litigation, 36 Tut. L. REv. 443 (1963).
101 Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l. 320 F.2d 219, 242 (2d Cir. 1963)
(dissenting opinion); HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYsTEm 678 (1953).
102 Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, supra note 101, at 222.
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Judge Friendly may well be correct in decrying the confusion
caused by unsound and obsolete standards once promulgated by
Swift v. Tyson and oftentimes espoused by our modern federal
courts and commentators directly in the face of the Erie edict.10 3
He states:
The complementary concepts-that federal courts must follow state decisions
on matters of substantive law appropriately cognizable by the states whereas
state courts must follow federal decisions on subjects within national
legislative power where Congress has so directed-seem so beautifully simple
and so simply beautiful, that we must wonder why a century and a half
were needed to discover them, and must wonder even more why anyone
should want to shy away once the discovery was made.' 04
Perhaps Judge Friendly thus strikes the note of harmony between
federal and state laws in diversity cases which will in time prove
to be the wisest and most prudent standard formulated.
A
SERVICE IN CIVIL CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS
The contempt power was known and enforced by the courts
at an early stage in the development of the common law.'
Historically, the law has distinguished between two distinct types
of contempt.2  When courts employed their contempt power chiefly
as a punitive measure to preserve their authority, vindicate their
judicial dignity and punish the disobedience of their mandates,
the act it disciplined was defined as a criminal contempt.3 How-
ever, when utilized as a coercive instrument to safeguard the private
rights of litigants and to compel obedience to decrees to which
parties were entitled, the chastised act was designated as a civil
contempt.4  Although the distinction between these two contempt
powers is real, one and the same act may often be considered a
criminal as well as a civil contempt.5
In New York, the civil contempt power is embodied in Section
753 of the Judiciary Law. This statute generally defines civil
103 Friendly, supra note 97, at 92.
104 Ibid.
I See Fox, The Practice in Contempt of Court Cases, 38 L.Q. REv. 185(1923).
2 People ex rel. Munsell v. The Court of Oyer & Terminer, 101 N.Y.
245, 4 N.E. 259 (1886).
3In re Nevitt, 117 Fed. 448, 458 (8th Cir. 1902).4 1d. at 453-54.
UUnited States v. United Mineworkers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 294-95
(1947).
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